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angles throughout and presents much original material. A translation into English would be
welcome, as would a much-needed index.
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In Trying Leviathan, D. Graham Burnett uses an 1818 court case over a New York statute
requiring the inspection of ﬁsh oil in order to illuminate a range of problems concerning knowl-
edge about the natural world, including detailed debates over classiﬁcation and broader issues of
whose knowledge counts as authoritative. At the same time, the book relates this particular case
to a number of recent discussions among historians of science, to do with science in the courts,
science in the early American republic and the relationship between the history and the philos-
ophy of science.
As Burnett recounts, the seeds of the trial began when a candle-maker and oil merchant,
Samuel Judd, refused to pay the fee required by an inspector, James Maurice, on the grounds that
Judd’s casks contained not ﬁsh oil but whale oil. Judd’s stance was then debated by a range of
witnesses brought for the jury’s ediﬁcation, from naturalists to whalers, each with diﬀerent
criteria regarding what makes something a ﬁsh, how to decide and who should decide. Central to
Burnett’s story are the respective parries of William Sampson, who represented Maurice, and the
naturalist Samuel Latham Mitchill, who testiﬁed for the defence.
Aside from recounting what happened at the trial, Burnett aims, he explains, to use the case to
illuminate three sets of issues. First, as an example of science in the early republic, the case
illustrates the (often contested) status there of both ‘philosophers ’ and natural history. Second, it
oﬀers material for a discussion of cetaceans as ‘problems of knowledge’ for which various dis-
tinct groups claimed to oﬀer authoritative knowledge on quite diﬀerent grounds. Finally, it serves
‘as a window onto the contested territory of zoological classiﬁcation in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries ’ (p. 7). Here in particular Burnett is urging historians of science to
reconsider common narratives. By examining a case where scientiﬁc specialists had to engage
with each other and a wider public, Burnett reveals the limited kind of consensus classiﬁers could
achieve, highlighting the wide range of citizens who could claim expertise about the natural
world.
To draw this much material out of a two-day trial, Burnett takes the reader on a fascinating
tour of the ‘whale knowledge’ of naturalists, sailors, whalemen, artisans, merchants and dealers,
as well as ‘everyone else’ (or, in Sampson’s words, ‘ those who neither ﬁsh, manufacture, nor
philosophize’ (p. 18)). Through detailed examination of a great variety of sources, including
school primers, museum inventories and sailors’ doggerel, Burnett builds up a thorough under-
standing of how people thought of whales in the early republic.
He also admirably draws out the implications of numerous authorities regarding whales and
the ties to particular loyalties of class, geography and race. The demonstrated lack of consensus
regarding ‘what is a whale’ and who should decide must, as Burnett says, call into question
traditional histories of classiﬁcation that portray either Linnaean taxonomy or Cuverian com-
parative anatomy as triumphing due to the constant march of scientiﬁc progress. The trial high-
lights the extraordinary lack of consensus among naturalists especially. Sampson ridiculed
the naturalists’ claim to authority, emphasizing successfully, as even the defence acknowledged,
‘how little philosophers are agreed amongst themselves ’ (p. 205). Furthermore, the presence of
numerous ‘disintegrative interests ’ making claims regarding natural-history knowledge must
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sharply qualify the thesis that natural history served as a unifying ﬂag for nation-building. ‘The
nomenclature of nature could be held both to secrete and unmask conﬂicting identities ’, as Burnett
puts it. ‘Calling nature’s nation into being with the incantations of natural history could be, when
the curtain fell, a very uncertain aﬀair ’ (p. 210). He oﬀers the Maurice vs Judd case as an early
example of subsequent challenges to the claims of expertise of patrician philosophers and natu-
ralists by a new class of artisans and mechanics that had a major impact on the institutions and
claims of science in the early republic. In Burnett’s view, such contests should not be seen simply
as unfortunate hiccups in the otherwise progressive development of American science but as
fascinating sites of negotiation, of great interest in their own right, regarding how the natural
world should be known and by whom.
In conclusion, Burnett makes the obvious (to historians) point that, in asking historical
questions for the purpose of supporting normative, philosophical arguments, ‘ there is no substi-
tute for actually doing the history’. As an example, he takes aim at John Dupre´’s work on
‘the relationship between ordinary language classiﬁcation of living creatures and their formal
scientiﬁc arrangement’ (p. 212; original emphasis), speciﬁcally the conjectural history oﬀered by
Dupre´ that greater scientiﬁc knowledge of whales, pure and simple, was all that mattered in the
modern deﬁnition of whales as ‘not ﬁsh’.
A close look at how whales actually became non-ﬁsh in New York in the early nineteenth
century has told a very diﬀerent story: in fact what happened then and there was that scientiﬁc
expertise took a terribly public bloody nose, and whales ceased to count as ﬁsh because of the
behind-the-scenes legislative lobbying by a clique of oil merchants and chandlers … By the
time it was over ‘science’ had been sent to the wings by all concerned. (p. 214)
At times some of the rather extensive commentaries in footnotes would have beneﬁted from
editorial culling to avoid such asides making the book read like a dissertation. And, as in any
‘science at the bar’ story, one sometimes wonders whether all the author claims really was at
stake. Maybe the records simply illustrate an intelligent lawyer merely doing his job well? But
Burnett makes a convincing argument that, whether Sampson personally saw anything grand at
stake, he was drawing on the concerns, categories and even jokes of those around him. And by
uncovering the contemporary debates and anxieties concerning the natural order, and who had
the authority to deﬁne that order, Burnett oﬀers readers a fascinating episode in the history of
early American science, along the way raising questions about both the authority of professional
naturalists and the historiography of modern (and especially American) science.
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Jamie Elwick’s aim in this important book is to characterize transformation in the life sciences in
Britain in the period before the publication of Darwin’sOrigin of Species. It was a period that saw
museums give way to zoos and aquaria, patronage displaced by meritocracy, and a whole re-
search area overturned without having its central projects completed or even acknowledged. With
that research area went a particular perspective on what it is to be a biological individual.
Elwick shows us all these changes interwoven as a shift in ‘styles of reasoning’. These styles he
takes – in the manner of Ian Hacking and others – to be methodological approaches which de-
termine the appropriate questions to be asked and the right ways to go about answering them.
The earlier, overturned style that concerns Elwick is what he calls the ‘analytic:synthetic ’ style.
A synchronic approach, favouring the use of dead specimens for dissection, it involved the
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